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Since 2002, the United States has engaged in a new form of warfare that is not 
fought by armies or navies but by pilotless aircraft able to conduct surveillance and direct 
missile strikes across the globe.  To date, US military drones have launched hundreds of 
attacks against locations in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen (Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism 2016).  During the Obama presidency, a program that began as a strategic 
alternative to direct military intervention became the dominant means of confronting 
imminent threats to national security before they came to fruition.  Increased reliance 
upon this new technology has resulted in international criticism (IHRCRC 2012; 
Amnesty International 2013a).  Using a theoretical framework based upon critical 
discourse analysis, I examine the discursive features employed by President Obama and 
his advising legal and counterterrorism staff to legitimate the use of drone missile strikes.  
Taking into account previous research on metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 2003), 
legitimation (van Leeuwen 2008; Reyes 2011), and temporal discourse (Dunmire 2011), I 
examine the political discourse incorporates metaphorical conceptualizations that 
dehumanize, uses fear to create to discourage regulation of drone strikes and projections 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 2002, the United States has used remotely piloted aircraft, or drones, to 
launch missile strikes against targets suspected of being affiliated with al Qaeda and 
engaging in activity that poses a threat to US national security.  Several reviews have 
been done on the legal arguments supporting the use of force via drones (Gogarty and 
Hagger 2008; Larson and Malamud 2011; Winter 2011; Blank 2012; Sterio 2012), but 
there remains a need to critically analyze rhetorical features of the supporting political 
legitimation.  The following analysis of eleven speeches delivered by President Barack 
Obama and his advising staff of legal and counterterrorism advisors examines discursive 
features and emphasizes the potential impact these features have on shaping the 
conceptual models audience members form concerning the use of drone strikes.  Through 
a critical discourse analysis, I found metaphors as well as emotional and temporal 
language contributed to a strategy of avoiding additional oversight and countering 
political concerns raised by opponents of the program.  The diversion of additional 
oversight and accountability of the drone program is accomplished through discursive 
acts of dehumanization, eliciting the fears of victimization and confirming the belief that 
the threat of future attacks is made all the more likely if restraints are placed on the 
military capabilities of the state apparatus.    
The US drone campaign has had a significant physical impact on communities.  
Since 2009, there have been over 500 drone strikes carried out against people in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia (Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2016).  Additional strikes have 




been subjected to over an estimated 350 drone strikes.  As of 2016, the United States 
owns over 7,000 drones, many of which are armed (New America Foundation 2016).  
Over 3,500 people have been killed by hundreds of US drone strikes (Center for the 
Study of Targeted Killing 20161).  Targets of US drone strikes are adherents and affiliates 
of al Qaeda that have been identified through multiple intelligence sources to be a 
valuable target.  High-Value Targets (HVIs) require the authorization under the command 
of the executive branch.  However, due to the lack of transparency over how each strike 
is authorized and carried out, it is impossible to know how often drone operators or their 
immediate supervisors are called upon to act immediately in a time sensitive situation in 
which a pattern of suspicious behavior has been identified.  A number of strikes have 
targeted US citizens, either cooperating with or detained by al Qaeda, and innocent 
civilians.  The loss of innocent life is but one of many public criticisms that have been 
waged against the US drone program.  Additional scrutiny needs to be placed on exactly 
how US drone strikes are authorized and carried out in order to account for the loss of 
innocent life and the reliance on drone technology.  I believe that in order to do so, we 
must focus on the data available to use and focus a lens on the political legitimation of 
these strikes through a critical discourse analysis.  
As the US began to increasing rely upon drone strikes, public debate emerged 
over the program’s strategic effectiveness, ethics and legality (Plaw, Fricker and Colon 
2016).  Although drone strikes appear to offer short term tactical successes by eliminating 
                                            
1 Drone strike totals for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen are gathered from multiple sources and 
are estimates.  Due to the lack of an official repository how many US drone strikes have occurred, I have 





people that threaten the US population or interests, concerns have been raised as to 
whether tactical successes equate to long-term strategic effectiveness.  A myth of drone 
effectiveness began to take hold in which targeting effectiveness comes to imply strategic 
effectiveness (Boyle 2013).  There is nothing to determine whether or not the actions 
being taken by the US are strategically effective at addressing the sources of extremist 
violence and this may be by design.  Drone technology is purported to be the most 
effective strategic tool to the United States but there is a lack of transparency on exactly 
how each of the strikes carried out has led to the complete dismantling of al Qaeda 
command hierarchy or eliminated their operational capabilities.  Lacking any benchmarks 
of success, the promotion of drones as strategically effective serves merely as an 
ideological trigger designed to garner public support.  
The ethics of the US drone program have been evaluated in terms of just warfare 
and the legality has been questioned both in terms of international and US domestic law.  
Others concerns raised include signature strikes, the targeting of Americans, civilian 
casualties, the lack of oversight and whether the administration has a preference for 
killing (Plaw, Fricker and Colon 2016).  Criticisms of the drone program have been made 
by foreign and US political officials, international humanitarian organizations and 
academics (O’Connell 2010; Benjamin 2012; Cohen 2012; Imtiaz 2012; IHRCRC. 2012; 
Amnesty International. 2013b; Boyle 2013).  In turn, the Obama administration sought to 
address concerns through a series of speeches.   
Through a high-profile media campaign, consisting of public speeches, leaked 




arguments supporting the US drone program as legal and ethical use of force (Plaw, 
Fricker and Colon 2016).  Attorney General Eric Holder sent letters to some members of 
the government (Shane 2013).  Unofficial comments and memos, such as the Office of 
Legal Counsel Memo on Targeting an American, were leaked by administration officials 
to the media (Savage 2014), and a white paper was released from the Department of 
Justice outlining the lawfulness of a using lethal force against a US citizen (US 
Department of Justice 2013). 
For this study, I will focus on the public speeches that were given, as these had 
the largest audiences and had several rhetorical features absent from the official and 
unofficial documents released.  Given the serious implications of the drone program for 
innocent civilians and the potential strategic consequences for global security, I have 
analyzed the political speeches justifying the use of drone strikes.  My study builds upon 
prior research by looking specifically into the discursive features that enhance legal 
theories through ideological premises and mental conceptualizations that function to 
discourage increased oversight and strengthen public support for drone strikes.  But 
before I discuss the political discourse, I will first discuss the political issues surrounding 
drone use and how criticisms prompted responses from the Obama administration.  In the 
following literature review I will discuss criticisms that have been made by legal scholars 
and social scientists about the legality, ethics and morality of the US drone program.  At 
times, I will also discuss how the Obama administration responded to these criticisms, 
but only those responses that are not part of my discourse analysis and which mentioning 




discourse within the United States has been studied and how this research informed my 
analysis.  Finally, before discussing my findings and conclusions, I outline my analytical 
approach and why I limited my focus to eleven speeches delivered by members of the 
Obama administration. 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The US drone program has been a point of contention with legal scholars and 
academics for years and has garnered much criticism.  I begin my review of the literature 
by discussing the concerns raised by academics and public officials alike on the use of 
this controversial technology.  One of the most significant political issues advocates of 
the drone program face is whether drone strikes are illegal, either under US law, 
international law or both.  Both Democratic and Republican officials have questioned the 
legality of drone strikes.  For example, Dennis Kucinich, along with six others, argued 
that drone strikes violate executive order preventing any person employed by or acting on 
behalf of the United States government to engage in assassination (US Congress 2010).  
Diplomats from allied nations have claimed that drone strikes violate human rights, and 
UN officials have reported that strikes violate international law (Gogarty and Hagger 
2008).  Mary Ellen O’Connell (2010), an international law scholar, testified before 
Congress that drone strikes are extrajudicial killings.  These criticisms are valid and 
informative, but fail to critically examine how violence is foundational to law.  By 
focusing only on how drone strikes may violate laws, be they US or international, the 
harm of legitimate state killing becomes masked. 
In response to criticisms of the program legality, White House legal advisors, 
such as Harold Koh, began in 2010 to specifically outline the legal rationale behind drone 
strikes.  In terms of domestic legality, the administration initially cited the Authorization 
to Use Military Force (AUMF) of 2001, which states that the president has the authority 




2001.  To defend the program as legal under international law, the administration claimed 
that drone strikes have been carried out in accordance with the laws governing the use of 
armed force.  The official position of the White House was initially that drones are 
considered acts of self-defense because al Qaeda attacked the United States on September 
11, 2001, which initiated an armed conflict.  Because each strike is part of an ongoing 
armed conflict, defenders of the drone program claim causalities of strikes cannot be 
classified as assassinations or extrajudicial killings (Johnson 2013).  However, since the 
rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the use of drone strikes has been 
interpreted as one of the inherit powers granted to the commander in chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States when called into the actual service of the United States, as 
stated in Article II of the US Constitution.  Since June 2014, Obama has deployed drone 
strikes against ISIL without congressional authorization, and because no ground troops 
were deployed, the strikes do not violate the War Powers Resolution (Kaag and Kreps 
2014).  In addition, Eric Holder has argued that there is no limitation to geographic scope, 
meaning that strikes may be carried out on US soil2 (Holder 2012).   
Accompanying questions of legality are concerns about the manner in which 
strikes are carried out.  Typically, there are two ways in which a drone strike may be 
authorized.  First, intelligence gathered from various means is verified and compiled into 
a targeting packet that identifies a specific person believed to pose a threat to the United 
States (Plaw, Fricker and Colon 2016).  The second form of drone strike is called a 
                                            
2 There is an implicit assumption in the discourse produced by the Obama administration that killing 
Americans, especially on US soil, is worse than killing other people. This is not an assumption I share and I 




signature strike, which is when the United States believes it has identified potential 
enemy combatants based upon an observed pattern of behavior but does not know the 
exact identity of the target or targets (Plaw, Fricker and Colon 2016).  In 2012, twenty-six 
members of US House of Representatives and members of the House Judiciary 
Committee wrote letters to President Obama and Attorney General Holder demanding the 
criteria and legal justification for signature strikes (Imtiaz 2012).  Obama and his 
advising counsel confirmed that signature strikes occurred but asserted that those strikes 
remain legal under the authorities granted by Congress in the AUMF of 2001 and are 
rarely relied upon.  Obama (2013) has stated the United States would cease or limit the 
use of signature strikes outside of the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater.  Independent 
accounts suggest fewer signature strikes are being conducted, but it is impossible to know 
with certainty, and the practice of signature strikes has had devastating effects on 
innocents (Plaw, Fricker and Colon 2016).  For example, on January 15, 2015 a signature 
strike in Pakistan killed two American hostages (Shane 2015).   
Drone strikes that result in the deaths of innocent civilians raise considerable 
political backlash.  Medea Benjamin, CODEPINK co-founder, a women-led grassroots 
movement to end US wars and militarism, has actively protested on multiple occasions 
against the US drone campaign (Plaw, Fricker and Colon 2016).  In 2012, Benjamin 
traveled to Pakistan to speak with the victims of drone strikes and found that claims made 
by administration officials concerning civilian causalities were not accurate.  Upon return 
Benjamin confronted  John Brennan, counterterrorism advisor to the White House, at his 




responded that it was untrue that drone strikes killed civilians (ibid).  However, in April 
2013 leaked government documents showed civilians had died as a result of drone 
strikes, including a strike that occurred only two months prior to Brennan’s public denial 
that strikes endangered civilians (Searle and Woods 2013).  Since then, President Obama 
and John Brennan have assured media outlets that civilian causalities are rare and within 
the requirements of the laws of war (Brennan 2012b; Obama 2013).  Obama described 
drone strikes as a risky but argued that every effort was made to ensure that there is “near 
certainty” no civilians will be killed or injured as a result of a strike (Obama 2013).  The 
US drone program has garnered protest from even elected officials.  In 2013, after 
receiving a letter from Eric Holder refusing to rule out strikes on American soil, Senator 
Rand Paul filibustered John Brennan’s confirmation as Director of the CIA for thirteen 
hours (Michaels 2013).   
Some have even gone as far as to accuse the Obama administration of preferring 
kill operations over capture.  US Senators, such as Saxby Chambliss, have suggested the 
administration prefers to kill terrorist leaders rather than deal with the legal issues 
associated with taking prisoners (Becker and Shane 2012).  The preference has been 
linked to President Obama’s efforts to close Guantanamo Bay and limited options in 
terms of alternative detention facilities (Roberts 2013).  The Human Rights Watch (2013) 
determined that certain attacks in Yemen could have been capture operations, and some 
strikes did not even meet the threshold set by the Obama administration.  Noah Feldman 
(2013) stated that it was the desire to end torture, which began under the Bush 




strongly denies having any preference for killing.  The administration has, however, 
argued that capture operations would place military personnel at risk and threaten 
international relations by violating national sovereignty (Obama 2013). 
 Although there is general public support for the US drone program, specific 
aspects of the campaign influence the level of support.  For example, in 2013, nearly half 
of all registered voters indicated that they felt drone strikes targeting US citizens were 
illegal, while only a quarter thought the drone strikes were legal (Publicmind 2013).  Two 
years later, 64% of Americans reported being very or somewhat concerned about the 
legality of drone strikes as a whole (Pew Research Center 2015).  Multiple polls have 
suggested that Americans are concerned with the incidental targeting of civilians.  In May 
2015, 48% of Americans reported being very concerned that US drone attacks endanger 
the lives of innocent civilians; a finding corroborated by two additional polls (Pew 
Research Center 2015). 
Public concerns and protests have led to calls for increased oversight and 
transparency of the drone program.  For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates has publicly stated there is a need for oversight over future presidencies when 
deploying drones (Associated Press 2013).  Gates’ argument is that strikes against 
American citizens should be decided by some additional oversight process, either judicial 
or congressional.  Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein also 
called for additional measures of oversight.  One recommendation included the creation 
of a court that would grant authority to conduct a drone strike on a case by case basis, 




Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson (2013) devoted an entire speech 
directly responding to the suggestion of an additional court.  Johnson called the FISA 
court a rubber stamp court that approved most, if not all, applications.  Johnson also 
stated that since strikes are time specific, requiring lawyers and officials to assess 
situations in real time, judges are not well suited since many prefer time to contemplate a 
case and not rule on dynamic, ongoing operations.  Johnson speculated that an additional 
court would create restraints for drone pilots to act in time sensitive manner and, in turn, 
hypothetically allow terrorists to go on unabated.  Johnson presented this hypothetical as 
a drone pilot not being able to launch a strike against a training compound in time 
because he/she was waiting on authorization from the drone court.    
Although the Obama administration has aggressively countered calls for increased 
oversight, there have been occasions when an increase in legal propriety seemed possible.  
In March 2013, there was an effort to shift operations from the C.I.A. to the Department 
of Defense (Miller 2013).  C.I.A. drone strikes are carried out covertly and are not subject 
to public oversight due to the agency’s civilian status.  The effort to limit drone strikes by 
the C.I.A. was promoted by both activists and politicians as a means to increase 
transparency since C.I.A. strikes are conducted covertly.  However, the effort was stalled 
because intelligence committees resisted the plan.  Reportedly, Michael D’Andrea, the 
head of the C.I.A. Counterterrorism Center, and other top agency officials convinced 
lawmakers that the C.I.A. strikes are more precise than those conducted by the 
Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command (Mazzetti and Apuzzo 2015).  In 




oversight of drone strikes (Hosenball 2013).  According to the new legislation, spy 
agencies would be required to release causality statistics, and there would be increased 
scrutiny for attacks against US citizens on foreign soil.  However, in April 2014, the 
language was removed at the request of the director of National Intelligence, James 
Clapper, who disclosed that the Obama administration was voluntarily exploring ways to 
disclose more information (Ackerman 2014).  Two months earlier, when the Senate 
Armed Services Committee held a hearing calling upon C.I.A. and military 
counterterrorism representatives to defend the use of drone strikes, the White House 
reportedly notified the committee that C.I.A. were not required to attend (Dilanian 2014).  
Michael Cohen (2012) described actions of the executive branch as attempts to stonewall 
or uses legal justification to avoid oversight.  Kenneth A. Schultz (2003), a professor of 
political science at Stanford University, argues Congress tends to shy away from 
oversight regarding national security out of fear of the political blowback if there is 
another attack.  I argue that fear of political blowback is fostered, in part, through 
discourse that emphasizes the potential consequences of increased regulation in order to 
illicit a fear of future terrorist attacks. 
Several studies have examined how the language of war has shaped political 
responses and formed sociopolitical realities.  Smith (2005) describes the cultural 
narratives used to support war.  Smith identifies how specific narrative structures are used 
to overcome cultural constraints on violence and how genre choices, or “wars”, inform 
the “autonomous cultural structures” that shape national responses to conflicts. Smith 




determined what action was suitable when facing the potential or war or justifying the 
harm already being carried out during warfare.  The perpetual war that the US drone 
program presents is best captured in what is called a legitimation or credibility trap.  The 
need for war continues because the political discourse used to draw forth national support 
has rhetorically determined all appropriate responses, regardless if the present 
circumstances suggest otherwise.  If a political administration tells a story and tell it 
repeatedly, it limits options available.  What my analysis shows is that the discourse 
produced by the Obama administration, one that draws upon metaphors of cancer, fear, 
and time, are a perfect formula for endless war.  Prior research has shown how the 
political legitimation of past administrations have entrapped the American populace into 
military engagements that were ultimately not beneficial to the US or those regions 
subject to the intervention, such as Nicaragua (Kenworthy 1983).  The same vulnerability 
to entrapment is possible if al Qaeda or ISIS is characterized as nothing more than evil, 
than the US cannot tolerate these organizations in any form.  Bent on absolute 
annihilation, the US closes itself from other strategic possibilities that may be more suited 
to bringing peace and sow the seeds for the perpetual war through a dependence on the 
drones to maintain security.  The legitimation of the US drone program is not only the 
justification and rationalization of state violence; it is the formation of a socio-political 
reality that is created in the minds of the American people (Hodges 2011).  And it is the 
American people that become entrapped in this world, or mental models (van Dijk 1998) 




Hodges (2011) examined the narratives specifically supporting the US “War on 
Terror.”  Hodges analyzed multiple speech acts by different speakers and showed how 
intertextuality was an important element of the War on Terror.  Hodges specifically 
focused on how al Qaeda (AQ) was discursively constructed, how discursive links were 
created to link AQ to Iraq, and how these worked together to form a sociopolitical reality 
that informed the war effort and public support.   
Reyes (2011) compared speeches by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama, identifying legitimation strategies outlined by van Leeuwen (2007).  Reyes found 
that both presidents employed similar legitimation techniques despite being members of 
opposing political parties.  In addition to the legitimation strategies categorized by van 
Leeuwen, Reyes identified techniques that were unique to his sample and extended the 
study of political discourse.  Reyes showed that while rationalizations are culturally 
bound and have limited reach, emotions, particularly of fear, are responses to a sense of 
protectionism, more remote and inherent within the human psyche and more broadly 
influential.   
The temporal dimension of political discourse can have a powerful influence on 
the conceptual models we form, such as the necessity for action in the present to forego 
the risk of unknown harms in the future, and Dunmire has done extensive research on 
how the future has been used to influence public policy.  Dunmire (2011) shows how 
descriptions of future events were crucial components of the Bush doctrine and post-Cold 
War US security discourse in general.  Patricia Dunmire (2011) analyzed the National 




presidency.  Dunmire found that the policy used threat as a nominalization, shifting the 
use between a verb and a noun.  In the way that nominalization was used in NSS02, the 
future actions that were going to be taken by the United States were presupposed, rather 
than potentialized.  Through the use of nominalization, a political actor may situation a 
proposition within the “presuppositional epistemic modality” and render it as background 
or assumed information (Givon 1989:133).  Threats function to invent political realities 
(Reisigl 2006).  By reinforcing the danger of the potential threat, the political actor is able 
to draw upon hypothetical evidence in support of proposals.  When the same analysis was 
applied to Obama’s 2011 National Security Strategy, Dunmire found similar defuturizing, 
but instead of the word preemption, the Obama administration emphasized prevention.  
Dunmire shows how hypothetical futures can be given presence and thereby rhetorical 
force.  Politicians often reconstruct the past as a means of bringing forth a potential future 
(Edelman 1971).  Claims that should be presented as assumptions about the future are 
instead framed as inevitable outcomes.  This play with (un)certainty over time is 
accomplished through modality. Modality is the expression of a speaker’s attitude toward 
and/or confidence in the proposition being presented.  An expression of confidence may 
be overt, such as the use of modal auxiliaries like may, might, can, could or will, or 
subtly implied within the context of the discourse.  In my analysis, I find that modality is 
an important aspect of discourse manipulation that serves to render future violence a 
certainty if the state apparatus is restrained.  This modal manipulation serves to legitimize 




future.  A persuasive aspect of policy discourse is in the manner it limits uncertainty 
about the future in support of action in the present (Bergmann 1992). 
My research into the political discourse of drone strikes critically examines the 
executive branch’s legitimation because the administration has on more than one 
occasion stalled efforts to increase transparency and accountability.  The use of the 
technology to prevent future attacks may actually inspire a new generation of violent 
extremists and place US citizens in greater danger.  Several military officials testify to the 
fact that drones come with a cost of growing animosity in the communities where they 
occur and result in the creation of new enemies (Shaw 2013).  The drone program could 
even damage the United States’ stance in the world by weakening US moral authority and 
popularity.  Beyond what impact drones have on the sociopolitical reality of war and 
peacetime, the legitimation of this technology through law and discourse only serves to 
mask the violence that is foundational to the state apparatus.  As the technology of war 
returns to the state from which it originated, so to will the harms and the discursive 
techniques used to legitimize the violence, which was already begun with the 
incorporation of drone technology into law enforcement within the US (Wall and 
Monahan 2011).  For these reasons, I seek to address a gap that exists with current 
research on US political discourse, which has focused on the legal dimensions of the 
drone debate with limited interest in the rhetorical and ideological dimensions of the 
administration’s defense.  I consider how prior studies examined the use of fear and time 
in political discourse in my analysis in order to understand the new ways these discursive 




to resolve the ongoing debate but merely identify the rhetorical features of the political 
discourse supporting the use and how these features compliment the underlying legal 
theories. 
Building upon Foucault’s (1977) panoptic model, research in recent years has 
sought to continue the study of emerging societal surveillance (Haggerty, Wilson and 
Smith 2011; Lyon 2003; Magnet and Rodgers 2011; Browne 2015; Monahan 2010).  
Critical criminology has considered how surveillance has transformed crime control as 
the state consolidates power around concealed surveillance practices (Haggerty, Wilson 
and Smith 2011; Magnet and Rodgers 2011).  New surveillance technologies are 
presented as objective and neutral, but in reality reinforce existing social inequalities 
(Magnet and Rodgers 2011). Systematic surveillance of minority communities in the 
United States has served to reify racial inequality and become a social and political norm 
(Browne 2015).  The impact of societal surveillance varies greatly based on social status 
and can become constraining on every part of an individual’s lived experience (Lyon 
2003).  
In terms of how surveillance has transformed national security practices and the 
military, research on visualizations suggests that drones are but one component in a larger 
shifting trend of the military industrial complex.  The wide availability of personal 
recording devices, such as digital cameras and microphone technology, has turned the 
combatant and citizen into a point of surveillance that makes combat more transparent 
(Ericson and Haggerty 2006).  For this reason, it has become a strategic priority for the 




complex panoptical and actionable form of surveillance with a centralized command 
structure (ibid). The end goal being a common picture of the battle space that facilitates 
the coordination of variety of actors.  This common picture being a manifestation of the 
privatization of national security (Monohan 2010). It is the partnership of government 
agencies and private companies that have spread fear of terrorist attacks and promoted 
technological means of prevention.  Monohan (2010) analyzed these processes of 
privatization by analyzing security conferences, the origin of the modern day drone 
technology, which are where the public and private sectors come together to create 
national security needs through consumption of the newest technology.  
Drones have also been shown to facilitate the processes of securitization, 
pacification and militarization (Neocleous 2011, 2014; Feldman 2015).  Rather than 
being a new form of military technology that has penetrated civilian spaces, Neocleous 
(2014) argues that drones are a continuation of policing that has been intrinsic to air 
power since the beginning.  What drones offer more than anything is disposability, which 
is paramount to their main function to gather information (Neocleous 2011).  Neocleous 
(2014) shows how modern drone warfare originates from colonial air power used by 
Britain in the 1920s.  The same techniques of legitimation that were used during British 
colonialism can be found today, with the distinction of “combatants” and “non-
combatants” disappearing and the entrance of perpetual warfare as a form of policing 
(Neocleous 2014:162).  No-fly zones became a form of “air occupation” that are made 
possible through the war powers of sovereign states in order to sustain order (187).  And 




(Neocleous 2008).  Neocleous (2008) points out that is has been the executive branch that 
has been the driving force behind engineering repressive security measures and shows 
that law has been a means of abolishing rights and freedoms in name of security.  
The executive branch has raised support for war through political discourse that 
creates a sociopolitical reality, but wars alone function as cultural imaginaries (Feldman 
2004).  War produces forms of inhumanity in pursuit of a security that depends upon the 
creation of new technologies, laws, and narratives about war and enemies (Feldman 
2015).  Feldman (2015) criticizes the regimes of truth that justify securitization and 
examines how state sovereignty is ensured the through physical, symbolic and structural 
violence.  
The US drone program, which enables perpetual war, builds from and deepens, 
domestically and abroad, state policing power.  The convergence of these structures 
deepens ideological work of pacification.  In the same manner air power was used to 
police the colonized, drones are entering the “boomeranging” phase of military 
technology in which the populace from whom it originated now become the target of its 
use (Wall and Linnemann 2014).  The process by which US law enforcement have been 
militarized with drone technology began with use of aerial surveillance, but militarization 
research suggests that it will not stop there (Wall 2016). Wall (2016) argues that more 
research should examine the power of the state to use emergency logic to justify any form 
of violence.  My research seeks to answer this call by examining the political rationalities 
and legal architectures of the US drone program as a means to understand the cultural 




Holder, serves to legitimize a potential future in which drones may be used to launch 
lethal force on US soil.  This emergency power is founded upon the discursive formation 
of a threat that could be anything, anyone or anywhere.  The limitless number of threats 






CHAPTER 3: DATA AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 
My approach to this thesis was informed both by study of discourse analysis and 
by my experience in the military.  For four years, I served in the US Army as an 
intelligence analyst tasked with the daily responsibility of sifting through hundreds of 
reports gathered from multiple intelligence platforms.  Drone surveillance and targeted 
strikes had a significant impact on the products I produced and how those products 
shaped the battlespace by informing future operations.  As a soldier, I understood the role 
drones played in war and aided in completing my mission, but afterwards I was left with 
a curiosity of how drones are presented and legitimized to the general public.  This 
curiosity led me to spend four years researching how drones, and war in general, is 
represented in discourse.  My original research began with one of three classified reports 
produced by the United States that analyzed the discourse of al Qaeda through their 
English recruitment magazine, Inspire.  However, after I was unable to access the two 
remaining reports via a Freedom of Information Act request, I turned my attention to the 
US Congressional committee hearings that focused on the US drone program.  What I 
discovered was not a legitimation of drone use but several inquiries by elected officials 
seeking to better understand the program and the effect on targeted communities.  The 
congressional hearings were often in response to political speeches made by 
representatives of the Obama administration justifying the use of drone strikes.   
My data consists of eleven speeches delivered by members of the Obama 
administration that I found were significant to the legitimation of drone strikes.  The 




Barack Obama, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, Attorney General Eric 
Holder, Department of Defense General Counsel and now Secretary of Homeland 
Security Jeh Johnson, and former White House Counter-Terrorism Advisor and current 
Director of the CIA John Brennan.  These eleven speeches were selected because of their 
direct reference or defense of drone strikes. Koh, Brennan, Holder, and Johnson each 
spoke on the legal and ethical concerns of the US drone program.  Of the three speeches 
given by President Obama, only one directly addressed the legitimacy of US drone 
strikes.  The two speeches Obama delivered in 2009 concerned US war efforts in general 
but were included for their relevance to the legitimation of US military initiatives, both 
inside and out of declared warzones.  I focus on eleven speeches in order to distill from 
the representatives the macro-level discourse that has emerged from the White House 
during President Obama’s first five years in office (Hodges 2011).  These eleven 
speeches were chosen because they either made direct reference to the use of drones by 
that US, in defense of the program’s legality or morality, or referenced US war efforts 
that appeared related to the use of drones.  I will not be assessing the truthfulness of their 
claims, but instead, focus on how the claims that are made create a social truth that has 
real consequences. 
I gathered transcripts from various internet sources and all speeches were 
available in video form, transcript or both.  Some of the transcripts were direct quotations 
of how the speeches were delivered, while others were prewritten scripts. When 
available, transcripts were compared to video recordings for accuracy.  Transcripts were 




Department of State, the Wilson Center, and Nobelprize.org (Obama 2009a; Obama 
2009b; Koh 2010; Brennan 2011; Johnson 2012a; Johnson 2012b; Holder 2012; Brennan 
2012a; Brennan 2012b; Johnson 2013; Obama 2013). 
 
Table 1. Speeches Selected for Analysis. 
Speaker Date Audience 
Barack Obama December 01, 2009 United States Military 
Academy 
Barack Obama December 09, 2009 Nobel Peace Prize Speech 
Harold Hongju Koh March 25, 2010 American Society of 
International Law 
John Brennan June 29, 2011 John Hopkins University 
Jeh Johnson February 22, 2012 Yale Law School 
Eric Holder March 05, 2012 Northwestern University 
John Brennan April 30, 2012 Wilson Center 
John Brennan August 08, 2012 Council on Foreign Affairs 
Jeh Johnson November 30, 2012 Oxford University 
Jeh Johnson March 18, 2013 Fordham Law School 




For my analytical approach, I read through each transcript multiple times and 
identified rhetorical devices and general themes.  After multiple readings, three particular 
themes emerged among the legal and ethical arguments. The themes of cancer as a 
metaphor, fear, and time became increasingly salient with each read through for their 
persuasive contributions and therefore became the focal points of my coding process.  I 
considered how rhetorical devices functioned to support the underlying legal argument, 
as well as how discursive features influence audience conceptualizations.  Based upon 




appeared most influential in the discourse once I had read over all of the material 
multiple times, I coded for use of metaphors and references to fear and time.  I found that 
legal arguments over the legitimacy of US drone strikes were often preceded or followed 
by explicitly emotional discourse or claims of future phenomenon.  Metaphors structure 
one concept in terms of another and make approaches taken to similar situations appear 
rational (Lakoff and Johnson 2003).  A metaphor can serve as the conceptual structure for 
systemizing ideology into text (Chilton and Schaffner 2002). I looked for excerpts that 
referenced fear, informed by the research of Lakoff (2001).  Lakoff showed how George 
W. Bush framed the war on terror as a fight against evil, “the discourse obligates the 
morally strong to take a stand” (ibid:61). Cast as an evil force, inaction becomes 
unthinkable for it would invite enemy forces to commit more attacks because they think 
they can get away with it (ibid).  The description of opposing forces as evil is ideological 
and operates to illicit fear from the reader or audience.  
I approached explicitly emotional excerpts in the manner of Reyes’ (2011), who 
showed how use of fear was an important legitimation technique and Dunmire’s (2011) 
study of the use of future in political discourse also informed my analysis of time in the 
text.  I also paid particular attention to modality, referential strategies, and the use of 
historical comparisons.  Modality is an important concept because it expresses certainty 
over claims made (Machin and Mayer 2012).  Modality is the expression of a speaker’s 
attitude toward and/or confidence in the proposition being presented.  I coded for all 
modal auxiliaries as well as any passages that expressed the speakers certainty over the 




al Qaeda, are represented in the conversation.  Referential strategies are often ideological, 
such as the reference of an opposing force as evil, and at times function to dehumanize by 
comparing others as animals or natural phenomenon.  Historical comparisons relate 
present persons, organizations or phenomenon to past events to rationalize similar 
responses.  Historical comparisons are often used to suggest that the approach to a current 
issue should be like one already taken before because of similarities the two situations 
share, while ignoring the many differences.   
During my initial coding of the text, I identified all nominalizations or examples 
of verbs being used as nouns to describe and project how future events will develop. 
Most of the time, when we speak we include specific temporal moments, which allow the 
listener to determine the degree of likelihood and certainty of outcome.  Nominalizations 
give concepts the agency of social actors (Dunmire 2011). For example, the concept of 
threat in policy discourse can take on roles, functions, and characteristics traditionally 
reserved for nouns. In doing so, political actors are able to justify action based on an 
abstract concept of a threat without providing details on how specific individuals or 
organizations are a threat to peace and security. 
Much of the rationalization I found in the analysis of the Obama administration 
discourse centered on legal theories.  Since legal scholars have extensively examined 
arguments made in support of the US drone program, I focus on how metaphors, fear, and 
time are used to as a part of these legal theories to increase the persuasiveness of the 
arguments.  I also argue that these discursive features influence the likely 




CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
 
 My analysis consists of three sections that highlight the discursive features I 
found to be crucial to constructing a sociopolitical reality unfavorable to oversight or 
increased transparency, while emphasizing the necessity of the drone program.  I begin 
with referential strategies used to dehumanize enemies of the US and innocent civilians 
by using metaphorical conceptualizations.  In the section that follows, I focus on the 
passages that emphasize fear in order to illicit an emotional response from the audience 
and dissuade increased regulation of drone strikes.  Finally, discuss how temporality, 
particularly with regard to the future, is used to stress the necessity of drone strikes while 
not requiring a projection as to when those strikes would end.  The selected quotes are 
not a comprehensive summary of metaphors, fear, or time found within the text but are 
representative of themes found throughout. 
Metaphor of Cancer 
 
First, I want to begin with a focus one on the metaphor AL QAEDA IS CANCER, 
which has been used by both President Obama and John Brennan.  In 2012, Brennan 
(2012a) remarked,  
“and so I spoke today, for the first time openly, about, again, what’s commonly 
referred to in the press as drones, remotely piloted aircraft, that can give you that 
type of laser-like precision that can excise that terrorist or that threat in a manner 
that, again, with the medical metaphor, that will not damage the surrounding 




world, it has metastasized in so many different places, and when that metastasized 
tumor becomes lethal and malignant, that’s when we’re going to take the action 
that we need to.” (Brennan 2012a) 
Brennan’s use of the metaphor AL QAEDA IS CANCER depicts drones as 
“laser-like” surgical tools capable of curing the global community.  The metaphor 
dehumanizes al Qaeda as a lethal and malignant tumor.  The adjunctive “malignant” is a 
characterization that serves to support the legal argument that drone strikes target those 
that pose an imminent threat.  However, imminence, as defined by the Obama 
administration, is contentious because it does not mean the strike halts an impending 
attack.  Imminent threats are “considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to 
act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, and the 
likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United States” (Holder 
2012).  The only requirement under this threshold is that harm must be possible, not 
likely or inevitable.  Dehumanization is an unfortunate technique that has become all too 
common in the defense of war efforts (Lakoff 2001).  However, what is most troubling 
about Brennan’s use of the metaphor AL QAEDA IS CANCER is how it simultaneously 
dehumanizes both members of al Qaeda and the innocent civilians who inhabit the same 
regions.  In Brennan’s quote, innocent citizens are surrounding tissue that will not be 
damaged.  Though in this quote Brennan expresses high modality that drone strikes do 





“It’s this surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the 
cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue 
around it, that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential.” (Brennan 2012a) 
The second quote expresses a lower modality, through the phrase ‘while limiting 
damage’, indicating there is a possibility that civilians will be harmed. 
The referential strategy to represent enemy forces as a cancer also serves to 
reinforce the legal principle that there is no geographic limitation to the use of drone 
strikes.  For example, in 2009, Obama stated,  
“we’re in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through 
that country.  But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of 
Pakistan.  That’s why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border” 
(Obama 2009a).   
This quote includes verb processes that are found throughout the text that 
emphasize that al Qaeda is not geographically limited and will spread if left untreated 
(i.e. spreading, taken root).  Brennan (2011) stated,  
“We are taking the fight to wherever the cancer of al-Qa’ida manifests itself, 
degrading its capabilities and disrupting its operations”  (Brennan 2011) 
Like cancer, the speakers suggest that al Qaeda has the potential to form 
anywhere and the United States will respond with a military “cure.”  This proclamation is 
accompanied by claims that the United States has been successful in dismantling and 




speakers emphasize implicitly through the metaphorical concept of cancer that the enemy 
is only in remission, not eliminated.   
“But we’ve pummeled the heart of al Qaeda in the Fatah, but the appendages of 
it, you know, are — still exist and continue to grow” (Brennan 2012b) 
Brennan’s quote conceptualizes separate enemies over vast distances as a unified 
whole and supports the legal theory that affiliates and adherents are viable targets.  Al 
Qaeda is described as being “badly damaged and bloodied,” but still able to “pack a lethal 
punch” (Brennan 2012b).  According to Johnson (2012), al Qaeda’s “senior leadership is 
today severely crippled and degraded."  The multi-armed organization is damaged, 
bloodied, crippled and degraded and yet still lethal.  The success of the drone program is 
captured in image of a mangled enemy while the same incapacitated enemy is held up as 
the ultimate threat to the global security and peace.  No matter the successes offered by 
the drone program, any potential threat al Qaeda may pose legitimates further use of 
drone strikes.   
The metaphor AL QAEDA IS CANCER is both a description of bodies with the 
potential of committing acts of violence and an ideology that infects the mind:  
“Al Qaeda has an ideology that infects the globe.  Nevertheless, this ideology 
persists, and in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, 
our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone.  We 





Obama’s description of al Qaeda’s ideology as infectious is presented in a speech 
that argues the necessity of war and the use of force.  The use of force is described as a 
means to render “the heart of al-Qa’ida incapable of launching attacks against our 
homeland, our citizens, or our allies, as well as preventing the group from inspiring its 
affiliates and adherents to do so” (Brennan 2011), but is also part of a broader strategy to 
win a “battle of wills” and “ideas.”  In terms of drone strikes, which have come to define 
Obama’s response to a dangerous ideology that threatens the well-being of the global 
political order, the actions taken to make an environment inhospitable for terrorists has 
simultaneously made that environment undesirable, if not inhospitable, for innocent 
civilians.  Many civilians have either been injured or killed as result of drone strikes.  
Children have testified before Congress about witnessing their loved ones being killed by 
drone strikes (McVeigh 2013).  Amnesty International (2013a) reported that there is a 
fear among many in Pakistan for blue skies because it means clear visibility for drones to 
conduct strikes.  When the speakers suggest that the drone program is strategic effective, 
both in terms of eliminating the enemy’s operational capabilities and winning over the 
affected communities, they are conflating of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.  
Counter-terrorism aims to defeat opponents by killing the enemy and destroying their 
cadres (Boyle 2010).  Counter-insurgency (COIN) aims to defeat its enemy by winning 
over the targeted population (Boyle 2010).  The speakers have sought to defend drone 







 Next, I want to draw attention to phrases that use fear influence national responses 
to the threat of an international terrorist attack. In 2009 Obama stated,  
“Evil does exist in the world.  A nonviolent movement could not have halted 
Hitler's armies.  Negotiations cannot convince Al Qaeda's leaders to lay down 
their arms." (Obama 2009b).   
Evil is an ideological descriptor.  This is an example of what Smith (2005) calls 
an apocalyptic narrative that claims “When the stakes are so high, the evil being faced so 
monstrous that nothing short of its complete destruction can be contemplated.” (26) Evil 
allows those responsible for justifying acts of violence to overcome cultural constraints 
on violent acts.  While demonization frees the speaker to commit harm, it limits the 
agency of its target to turn away from harm in the future. 
Jeh Johnson is a vocal proponent of the belief that al Qaeda is an evil that will 
never renounce violence and therefore all use of force is authorized.  In 2012, Johnson 
argued,  
“We cannot and should not expect al Qaeda and its associated forces to all 
surrender, all lay down their weapons in an open field, or to sign a peace treaty 
with us.  They are terrorist organizations … I am aware of studies that suggest 
that many ‘terrorist’ organizations eventually denounce terrorism and violence, 
and seek to address their grievances through some form of reconciliation or 




no compromise or political bargain that can be struck with those who pursue such 
aims.” (Johnson 2012b) 
Johnson asserts the belief that, despite what we have learned about violent 
insurgencies of the past, al Qaeda’s position as evil places them in a category all in their 
own.  Whether or not the claim is empirically true, which is unverifiable, Al Qaeda is 
conceptually denied the ability to surrender or compromise.  The message is paradoxical: 
Al Qaeda, however formidable a foe, is incapable of agency to determine their future, 
while the threat of Al Qaeda expresses agency to grow, shift, and evolve. 
Although in the text, al Qaeda is given no agency to turn from violence, the 
organization is given agency to “inflame anti American sentiment” and “bleed” the US 
financially (Brennan 2011).  The responsibility for inflaming anti American sentiment is 
placed onto al Qaeda for drawing the United States into war.  On multiple occasions, the 
speakers state that they never wanted war, but war was thrust upon them by the attacks of 
9/11.  Inflame is an adverb that denotes illness alluding to the cancer that is al Qaeda.  
The United States is described as bleeding money to support war efforts, but because that 
war is described as one thrust upon the United States and necessary, the debt incurred is 
not the fault of the United States. 
The most frequent uses of fear are found in descriptions of al Qaeda’s violence.  
On more than one occasion, Brennan accounts the victims of al Qaeda’s violence in detail 
to illicit an emotional response.  In 2011, Brennan stated, “There is nothing Islamic or 
holy about slaughtering innocent men, women, and children.” (Brennan 2011).  A year 




of Americans, men, women and children” (Brennan 2012a).  These quotes are examples 
of what Reyes’ calls an Explicit Emotional Enumeration (EEE).  Here the whole of 
innocent people is broken down into subgroups in order to emphasize that the enemy 
does not make distinctions among its victims (Reyes 2011). 
Time 
 
Finally, I want to discuss how the speakers have used both past and present to 
emphasize the necessity of the use of force and the finality of their approach.  In 2009, 
Obama stated, “A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies.  
Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms.” (Obama 
2009b).  The comparison between Hitler and al Qaeda serves to rationalize that equal 
measures of force should be used.  Just as the description of al Qaeda as evil removes 
agency of the terrorist organization from renouncing evil, so too does the comparison 
limit the potential responses by the United States to acts of force.   
Another example of a historical comparison was an analogy used by several of the 
speakers that compares the use of force to resist an ongoing attack against Pearl Harbor 
during WWII to the use of drone strikes against an imminent threat.  Koh first introduced 
this comparison in 2010, stating,  
“During World War II, for example, American aviators tracked and shot down 
the airplane carrying the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, who 
was also the leader of enemy forces in the Battle of Midway.  This was a lawful 




individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed and to avoid 
broader harm to civilians and civilian objects.” (Koh 2010).   
This analogy serves to form an equivalence between the danger of an ongoing 
attack by a military force and the potential harm posed by unidentified people with 
suspicious patterns of behavior.  I argue this is a false equivalence that legitimates 
preventative force with no guarantee that the strike prevents an inevitable violence and 
potentially poses greater risks to international security by stoking anti-American 
sentiment among the affected communities.    
In a comparison to more recent historical events, Obama argues that the use of 
force is necessary because present threats mirror threats faced prior to the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.   
“But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat 
closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11 ...  These attacks were 
all brutal; they were all deadly; and we learned that left unchecked, these threats 
can grow.  But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise 
to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.” (Obama 2013).   
This quote taps into America’s collective victimhood and the fear of 9/11 while 
setting up a hypothetical future.  References to 9/11 trigger “an emotional mode (fear, 
sadness, insecurity, revenge) in the audience, ideal to later on legitimize political actions 
based on the effects of those emotions” (Reyes 2011:789).  The comparison is absent of 
specific threats facing America, but instead gives agency to “threat” through the verb 




and once it does so it can cease the war efforts.  In 2013, Obama stated, “our commitment 
to constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end” 
(Obama 2013).  Because the drone program is placed within the category of war, 
speakers promise that it is finite like all past wars.  No matter the size and growth of 
threats facing America, every war has come to an end.  However, the current armed 
conflict includes technology never seen before and this promise only serves as a 
rationalization.  The future of the current conflict is unforeseeable.  This promise only 
serves to “defuturize” the future (Dunmire 2011:35).   
If the promise of drone program is to eliminate the threat of future attacks in order 
to bring an end to the current war, the promise is a hollow one by the Brennan’s own 
admission:  
“[A] responsible, effective counterterrorism strategy recognizes that no nation, 
no matter how powerful-including a free and open society of 300 million 
Americans can prevent every single threat from every single individual who 
wishes to do us harm.” (Brennan 2011).   
This final quote is an admission that absolute security is not possible.  The 
promises and fears that are played on throughout the speeches do not point to an 
inevitable end, but the perpetual stoking of fears of future attacks.  If it is not possible for 
any nation to prevent every single threat, how will there be an end to a program designed 
to prevent future threats?  Only through oversight, transparency and accountability may 
the American public ensure that the use of force is not the perpetual pursuit of 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
My thesis addresses a need to examine features of political discourse that 
legitimize state power and violence, in particular the use of drone technology to engage 
in targeted killings by the United States.  The analysis of discourse produced by the 
Obama administration revealed how state power is rhetorically solidified and how 
violence becomes appropriated as a cultural norm. I found that the Obama administration 
has used metaphorical conceptualizations to dehumanize, fear to create a political 
environment unsuitable for the formation of new regulations and temporal propositions 
about unforeseeable threats to portray the drone program as an imperative component of 
national security.  
Using the metaphor of al Qaeda as cancer, the Obama administration has been 
able to dehumanize the target population while also deemphasizing the significance of 
state violence against innocent civilians by casting collateral damage as necessary harm 
to surrounding tissue.  Reference to an ill global body plagued by a threatening force is 
extended to ideological levels as enemy ideas, not only violent actions, are described as 
infectious.  The conflation of counter-terrorism drone strikes with the counter-insurgency 
efforts to prevent the spread of ideas allows for the legitimation of strikes to extend to 
threats of the ideological form and focus attacks on individuals not directly engaged in 
carrying out an imminent attack.  These medical metaphors serve to reinforce an 
emergency logic supporting the use of force beyond geographic limitations.  An 




The Obama administration uses ideological descriptors to illicit fear from the 
intended audience and draw historical parallels to past wars.  Ideological descriptors, 
such as evil, enable a populace to overcome the cultural constraints on violence.  Because 
al Qaeda is cast as evil, the potentiality of peace beyond the organization’s utter 
annihilation completely diminishes.  Discursively, agency is removed from the formula 
leaving the only option one of violence.  To cement the emotion of fear, the speakers use 
enumerations on a number of occasions to stress how all types of people fall victim to 
terrorist attacks, while diverting attention from the collateral damage that comes as a 
result of drone strikes.  
The American populace is called into action against imminent threats that have 
yet to materialize with comparisons to historical atrocities.  Comparisons of evil operate 
to legitimatize equal responses of violence.  The legality of past uses of air power during 
moments of ongoing attack serve to justify the use of air power to police regions that 
threaten the socio-economic order by attacking national interests.  The administration 
promises to end the war, but not before eliminating all threatening forces, a condition that 
can never be fulfilled. This conditional promise maintains the perpetual war that has 
endless threats.  
Based on my findings, as well as prior research on the parallels of political 
discourse across US presidencies (Reyes 2011), I expect that future discussion around the 
use of drones will continue to emphasize the potential consequences of increased 
regulation by inciting fear and projecting into the future.  Political discourse such as this 




reality in of itself that traps the American populace, and the world in general, to a future 
of war seeking to end all war.  Absolute security is an absolute impossibility and to 
suggest otherwise serves only to justify the policing power of the state.  My analysis is 
consistent with prior research on the processes of securitization, pacification and 
militarization (Neocleous 2011, 2014; Feldman 2015) and offers insight in to the 
contemporary discourse surrounding drone technology.  
The findings of my study are limited in that they only account for the political 
discourse that legitimates and garners public support for the US drone program.  Even 
without the political discourse, there exists a cooperation between government agencies 
and private companies that continues to produce new technologies regardless of the 
political climate.  However, even though this study does not account for the political 
economy of drone warfare, the surplus of new technologies creates a need for the types of 
legitimation that I have focused on in my analysis.  As long as the military industrial 
complex persists, more political discourse that dehumanizes, incites fear and de-futurizes 
potential alternative courses of action can be expected.  New threats will be constructed 
and the perpetual war will continue.  
Future research into the political discourse of state power and international 
policing may consider how legitimation techniques used to justify drone use compares 
between nation states.  More research is needed into the defenses put forth by elected 
representatives that fail to place restraint on the power of the executive branch.  Elected 
officials of the legislative branch have a duty bound obligation to restrain the executive 




informed electorate holds officials accountable for carrying out the duties of their 
position.  In the years to come, it is imperative to continue to critically analyze political 
discourse and remain resistant to language that limits responses to international terrorism 
to be violent ones.  Careful consideration of how emotional discourse and conceptual 
metaphors shape perceptions of the sociopolitical reality may eventually weaken the 
persuasive influence these features have on determining US foreign policy and ultimately 
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